By Dan Baum, Playboy magazine, September 2004
Here's an issue of Playboy you really can read "just for the articles" -- especially Dan Baum's article, "Machine Politics", featured in the September 2004 issue. Here's a blurb about the story:
"After the Bush-Gore election, three Florida counties tossed out their punch-card ballots and replaced them with touch-screen computers. They've since been used in local elections, with unsettling results: Machines have crashed, votes have been lost, and voters have been turned away. In the November presidential contest, one in four people across the country will vote electronically. Are our election problems only going to get worse?"
Unfortunately, the article is not available on the magazine's web site so if you want to read it you'll have to get the magazine. Baum's article features some great commentary and quotes. I particularly like this comment from Michael Wertheimer of RABA Technologies:
"Fundamental infrastructure in this country is all regulated. We look to the Food and Drug Administration to keep our food safe, to the Federal Communications Commission to watch the airwaves, to the Federal Aviation Administration for air travel. For some reason, we don't do that for voting, which is the most important thing we do."
Tuesday, August 31, 2004
Florida judge: touchscreen counties must be able to do manual recounts
By David Royse, Associated Press, August 27, 2004
Excerpts:
A state rule barring the 15 Florida counties that use touchscreens from doing manual recounts is at odds with state law, which requires hand recounts in certain close elections, an administrative law judge ruled Friday.
A coalition of government watchdogs and other interest groups sued the state arguing the law requires provisions for hand recounts in every county, no matter what voting technology is used.
Administrative Law Judge Susan B. Kirkland agreed, writing that state law clearly contemplates "that manual recounts will be done on each certified voting system, including the touchscreen voting systems."
With a primary election Tuesday and more than half the state's voters in counties that use touchscreens, it's not clear what each of those counties will do.
Secretary of State Glenda Hood issued the ruling preventing manual recounts in touchscreen counties in April. She could appeal Kirkland's decision, which would automatically keep the rule in place for now. A spokeswoman for Hood said late Friday that she was considering that option.
Elections supervisors in some of the 15 counties with touchscreens had asked the state what they should do about a law requiring manual recounts when elections are particularly close, because the machines the counties use aren't programmed to create a paper record of each vote.
The Division of Elections issued the rule in April saying touchscreen counties couldn't conduct hand recounts, because such recounts are used to determine the intent of voters whose votes weren't counted. And that shouldn't be able to happen with touchscreens, state officials argued.
Touchscreens don't let people vote for more than one candidate in a race, known as an overvote, or to unintentionally fail to vote in a particular race, called an undervote. If they fail to vote in a race, the machine should alert them and prompt them to choose again if it was an oversight.
So with no undervotes or overvotes to recount, there's no need for one, Hood's office argued.
Department of State spokeswoman Jenny Nash blasted Kirkland's ruling.
"The touchscreen machines were put in place to avoid the problems that were encountered in the 2000 election," Nash said. "This ruling is a step backward to that time."
But Kirkland said if the Legislature had meant to exclude touchscreens from the requirement, it would have.
"The rule is contrary to the plain language of (the statute), which requires manual recounts of overvotes and undervotes when the margin of victory is one-quarter of a percent or less or when there is a proper and timely request for a manual recount," Kirkland found.
Kurt Browning, the elections supervisor in Pasco County, which has touchscreens, said he didn't know what to do because his county doesn't have any plan for recounting by hand.
"We're just kind of circling the airport until we figure out what it does mean," Browning said.
He agrees with Hood that there's no practical way to do a manual recount on touchscreen votes.
"There's nothing to recount," Browning said. "It doesn't provide overvotes. When you look at the undervote, an undervote is a non-vote so how do you count something that doesn't exist?"
But Vicki Cannon, the supervisor of elections in rural Nassau County, north of Jacksonville, said she could do a hand recount of touchscreen votes if the election were close enough to require it.
"Certainly we could if the state directed us to," Cannon said. "I would assume that we would print our ballot records, and count the candidates' names. Time consuming, maybe. Difficult? I don't think so."
-------
The judge also noted that evidence presented at the hearing established that there are touchscreen systems in existence that can provide a paper trail by printing a picture of the screen as it appears when a vote is cast.
The groups that sued included the American Civil Liberties Union, Common Cause of Florida and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. People for the American Way also supported the lawsuit.
Excerpts:
A state rule barring the 15 Florida counties that use touchscreens from doing manual recounts is at odds with state law, which requires hand recounts in certain close elections, an administrative law judge ruled Friday.
A coalition of government watchdogs and other interest groups sued the state arguing the law requires provisions for hand recounts in every county, no matter what voting technology is used.
Administrative Law Judge Susan B. Kirkland agreed, writing that state law clearly contemplates "that manual recounts will be done on each certified voting system, including the touchscreen voting systems."
With a primary election Tuesday and more than half the state's voters in counties that use touchscreens, it's not clear what each of those counties will do.
Secretary of State Glenda Hood issued the ruling preventing manual recounts in touchscreen counties in April. She could appeal Kirkland's decision, which would automatically keep the rule in place for now. A spokeswoman for Hood said late Friday that she was considering that option.
Elections supervisors in some of the 15 counties with touchscreens had asked the state what they should do about a law requiring manual recounts when elections are particularly close, because the machines the counties use aren't programmed to create a paper record of each vote.
The Division of Elections issued the rule in April saying touchscreen counties couldn't conduct hand recounts, because such recounts are used to determine the intent of voters whose votes weren't counted. And that shouldn't be able to happen with touchscreens, state officials argued.
Touchscreens don't let people vote for more than one candidate in a race, known as an overvote, or to unintentionally fail to vote in a particular race, called an undervote. If they fail to vote in a race, the machine should alert them and prompt them to choose again if it was an oversight.
So with no undervotes or overvotes to recount, there's no need for one, Hood's office argued.
Department of State spokeswoman Jenny Nash blasted Kirkland's ruling.
"The touchscreen machines were put in place to avoid the problems that were encountered in the 2000 election," Nash said. "This ruling is a step backward to that time."
But Kirkland said if the Legislature had meant to exclude touchscreens from the requirement, it would have.
"The rule is contrary to the plain language of (the statute), which requires manual recounts of overvotes and undervotes when the margin of victory is one-quarter of a percent or less or when there is a proper and timely request for a manual recount," Kirkland found.
Kurt Browning, the elections supervisor in Pasco County, which has touchscreens, said he didn't know what to do because his county doesn't have any plan for recounting by hand.
"We're just kind of circling the airport until we figure out what it does mean," Browning said.
He agrees with Hood that there's no practical way to do a manual recount on touchscreen votes.
"There's nothing to recount," Browning said. "It doesn't provide overvotes. When you look at the undervote, an undervote is a non-vote so how do you count something that doesn't exist?"
But Vicki Cannon, the supervisor of elections in rural Nassau County, north of Jacksonville, said she could do a hand recount of touchscreen votes if the election were close enough to require it.
"Certainly we could if the state directed us to," Cannon said. "I would assume that we would print our ballot records, and count the candidates' names. Time consuming, maybe. Difficult? I don't think so."
-------
The judge also noted that evidence presented at the hearing established that there are touchscreen systems in existence that can provide a paper trail by printing a picture of the screen as it appears when a vote is cast.
The groups that sued included the American Civil Liberties Union, Common Cause of Florida and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. People for the American Way also supported the lawsuit.
Mercury News Editorial: Lock in Shelley's e-voting gains
Secretary of State has political trouble, but his work on election reliability is groundbreaking; Governor should sign SB 1438
San Jose Mercury News editorial, August 31, 2004
Excerpts:
Secretary of State Kevin Shelley has hit the trifecta of trouble.
As the state's chief elections officer, he's under investigation for possible cronyism in distributing voter education money.
As a candidate, he's under investigation for possibly receiving improper campaign contributions.
As a boss, he's under investigation for alleged abusive behavior.
The effect of all this to Shelley's political career is his problem. What California voters should worry about is the threat to his groundbreaking work on assuring the reliability of touch-screen voting.
Shelley's troubles are all the more reason that Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger should sign a bill ensuring that Shelley's wisest decision -- requiring a paper trail -- becomes California law.
SB 1438 would mandate that, no later than January 2006, every county using a touch-screen voting system include a paper copy of the ballot. Voters would use it to verify the accuracy of their electronic votes. The bill is headed toward Schwarzenegger's desk.
When Senators Don Perata, an Oakland Democrat, and Ross Johnson, a Republican from Irvine, first proposed the bill this year, it appeared redundant. Shelley essentially had already done the same thing, through regulations from his office, in the fall of 2003.
But regulations, which another secretary of state can undo, aren't protection enough.
------
In his two years as secretary of state, Shelley has made plenty of enemies among county registrars of voters who resent the secretary's mandates for more security and accountability for electronic voting systems. They'd love to see him take a fall so they could try to roll back the paper trail and other important safeguards.
We doubt they'd succeed. But Schwarzenegger's signature on the paper-audit bill would build a moat around Shelley's reforms.
San Jose Mercury News editorial, August 31, 2004
Excerpts:
Secretary of State Kevin Shelley has hit the trifecta of trouble.
As the state's chief elections officer, he's under investigation for possible cronyism in distributing voter education money.
As a candidate, he's under investigation for possibly receiving improper campaign contributions.
As a boss, he's under investigation for alleged abusive behavior.
The effect of all this to Shelley's political career is his problem. What California voters should worry about is the threat to his groundbreaking work on assuring the reliability of touch-screen voting.
Shelley's troubles are all the more reason that Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger should sign a bill ensuring that Shelley's wisest decision -- requiring a paper trail -- becomes California law.
SB 1438 would mandate that, no later than January 2006, every county using a touch-screen voting system include a paper copy of the ballot. Voters would use it to verify the accuracy of their electronic votes. The bill is headed toward Schwarzenegger's desk.
When Senators Don Perata, an Oakland Democrat, and Ross Johnson, a Republican from Irvine, first proposed the bill this year, it appeared redundant. Shelley essentially had already done the same thing, through regulations from his office, in the fall of 2003.
But regulations, which another secretary of state can undo, aren't protection enough.
------
In his two years as secretary of state, Shelley has made plenty of enemies among county registrars of voters who resent the secretary's mandates for more security and accountability for electronic voting systems. They'd love to see him take a fall so they could try to roll back the paper trail and other important safeguards.
We doubt they'd succeed. But Schwarzenegger's signature on the paper-audit bill would build a moat around Shelley's reforms.
Saturday, August 28, 2004
CVF-NEWS: Update: CA Paper Trail Bill Moves Ahead
By Kim Alexander, CVF-NEWS, 8/27/04
The California Legislature is poised to pass an historic election reform bill, SB 1438.
The California Legislature is poised to pass an historic election reform bill, SB 1438.
Thursday, August 26, 2004
CVF-NEWS: E-voting reform in the U.S.: progress report & ten things elections officials can do to secure the vote this November
By Kim Alexander, CVF-NEWS, August 26, 2004
Today's CVF-NEWS provides a progress report on states that are improving election security, such as Nevada, Ohio, California and Indiana, and identifies ten thingselection officials across the nation can do to secure the vote this November.
Today's CVF-NEWS provides a progress report on states that are improving election security, such as Nevada, Ohio, California and Indiana, and identifies ten thingselection officials across the nation can do to secure the vote this November.
Monday, August 23, 2004
Secretive testing firms certify nation's vote count machines
By Bill Poovey, with Erica Werner, Rachel KonRad and Jay Reeves, Associated Press, August 22, 2004
Excerpts:
The three companies that certify the nation's voting technologies operate in secrecy, and refuse to discuss flaws in the ATM-like machines to be used by nearly one in three voters in November.
Despite concerns over whether the so-called touchscreen machines can be trusted, the testing companies won't say publicly if they have encountered shoddy workmanship.
They say they are committed to secrecy in their contracts with the voting machines' makers - even though tax money ultimately buys or leases the machines.
"I find it grotesque that an organization charged with such a heavy responsibility feels no obligation to explain to anyone what it is doing," Michael Shamos, a Carnegie Mellon computer scientist and electronic voting expert, told lawmakers in Washington, D.C.
The system for "testing and certifying voting equipment in this country is not only broken, but is virtually nonexistent," Shamos added.
Although up to 50 million Americans are expected to vote on touchscreen machines on Nov. 2, federal regulators have virtually no oversight over testing of the technology. The certification process, in part because the voting machine companies pay for it, is described as obsolete by those charged with overseeing it.
The testing firms - CIBER and Wyle Laboratories in Huntsville and SysTest Labs in Denver - are also inadequately equipped, some critics contend.
-----
"Four years after the last presidential election, very little has been done to assure the public of the accuracy and integrity of our voting systems," Rep. Mark Udall, D-Colo., told members of a House subcommittee in June at the same hearing at which Shamos testified.
"If there are any problems, we will spend years rebuilding the public's confidence in our voting systems," Udall said. "We need to squarely face the fact that there have been serious problems with voting equipment deployed across the country in the past two years."
In Huntsville, the window blinds were closed when a reporter visited the office suite where CIBER Inc. employees test voting machine software. A woman who unlocked the door said no one inside could answer questions about testing.
Shawn Southworth, a voting equipment tester at the laboratory, said in a telephone interview that he wouldn't publicly discuss the company's work. He referred questions to a spokeswoman at CIBER headquarters in Greenwood Village, Colo., who never returned telephone messages.
------
More than a decade ago, the Federal Election Commission authorized the National Association of State Election Directors to choose the independent testers.
On its Web site, the association says the three testing outfits "have neither the staff nor the time to explain the process to the public, the news media or jurisdictions." It directs inquiries a Houston-based nonprofit organization, the Election Center, that assists election officials. The center's executive director, Doug Lewis, did not return telephone messages seeking comment.
The election directors' voting systems board chairman, former New York State elections director Thomas Wilkey, said the testers' secrecy stems from the FEC's refusal to take the lead in choosing them and the government's unwillingness to pay for it.
Excerpts:
The three companies that certify the nation's voting technologies operate in secrecy, and refuse to discuss flaws in the ATM-like machines to be used by nearly one in three voters in November.
Despite concerns over whether the so-called touchscreen machines can be trusted, the testing companies won't say publicly if they have encountered shoddy workmanship.
They say they are committed to secrecy in their contracts with the voting machines' makers - even though tax money ultimately buys or leases the machines.
"I find it grotesque that an organization charged with such a heavy responsibility feels no obligation to explain to anyone what it is doing," Michael Shamos, a Carnegie Mellon computer scientist and electronic voting expert, told lawmakers in Washington, D.C.
The system for "testing and certifying voting equipment in this country is not only broken, but is virtually nonexistent," Shamos added.
Although up to 50 million Americans are expected to vote on touchscreen machines on Nov. 2, federal regulators have virtually no oversight over testing of the technology. The certification process, in part because the voting machine companies pay for it, is described as obsolete by those charged with overseeing it.
The testing firms - CIBER and Wyle Laboratories in Huntsville and SysTest Labs in Denver - are also inadequately equipped, some critics contend.
-----
"Four years after the last presidential election, very little has been done to assure the public of the accuracy and integrity of our voting systems," Rep. Mark Udall, D-Colo., told members of a House subcommittee in June at the same hearing at which Shamos testified.
"If there are any problems, we will spend years rebuilding the public's confidence in our voting systems," Udall said. "We need to squarely face the fact that there have been serious problems with voting equipment deployed across the country in the past two years."
In Huntsville, the window blinds were closed when a reporter visited the office suite where CIBER Inc. employees test voting machine software. A woman who unlocked the door said no one inside could answer questions about testing.
Shawn Southworth, a voting equipment tester at the laboratory, said in a telephone interview that he wouldn't publicly discuss the company's work. He referred questions to a spokeswoman at CIBER headquarters in Greenwood Village, Colo., who never returned telephone messages.
------
More than a decade ago, the Federal Election Commission authorized the National Association of State Election Directors to choose the independent testers.
On its Web site, the association says the three testing outfits "have neither the staff nor the time to explain the process to the public, the news media or jurisdictions." It directs inquiries a Houston-based nonprofit organization, the Election Center, that assists election officials. The center's executive director, Doug Lewis, did not return telephone messages seeking comment.
The election directors' voting systems board chairman, former New York State elections director Thomas Wilkey, said the testers' secrecy stems from the FEC's refusal to take the lead in choosing them and the government's unwillingness to pay for it.
Johnson county, Indiana to use paper ballots in November
By Michael W. Hoskins, The Daily Journal, August 21-22, 2004
Good news from Indiana -- Johnson County Clerk Jill Jackson recently announced the county will be using paper ballots this November rather than touchscreens.
-----
Excerpts:
Election Systems & Software, the company that sold Johnson County $2.4 million worth of touchscreen voting equipment late last year, has failed to get parts of the machines certified for use by Indiana election officials.
Johnson County’s election board in late July set Friday as the deadline for the company to get state approval. That had not happened by late Friday.
“We’re going with paper,” Johnson County Clerk Jill Jackson said. “I hate to do this to voters, but it’s the safest and surest thing to do. We have to have a backup plan in place.”
Although county election officials were pleased with the performance of touchscreen equipment supplied by ES&S for the May primary, they have repeatedly questioned the company’s integrity and considered terminating the $2.4 million contract.
County election administrators have accused ES&S of twice misleading them about the use of authorized equipment.
The company sold Johnson County the new touchscreen technology last year after county commission and council members approved the purchase.
However, a part of the equipment called firmware was not certified by state election officials. The state allowed counties to use the equipment in May but are requiring state approval for November’s election.
Good news from Indiana -- Johnson County Clerk Jill Jackson recently announced the county will be using paper ballots this November rather than touchscreens.
-----
Excerpts:
Election Systems & Software, the company that sold Johnson County $2.4 million worth of touchscreen voting equipment late last year, has failed to get parts of the machines certified for use by Indiana election officials.
Johnson County’s election board in late July set Friday as the deadline for the company to get state approval. That had not happened by late Friday.
“We’re going with paper,” Johnson County Clerk Jill Jackson said. “I hate to do this to voters, but it’s the safest and surest thing to do. We have to have a backup plan in place.”
Although county election officials were pleased with the performance of touchscreen equipment supplied by ES&S for the May primary, they have repeatedly questioned the company’s integrity and considered terminating the $2.4 million contract.
County election administrators have accused ES&S of twice misleading them about the use of authorized equipment.
The company sold Johnson County the new touchscreen technology last year after county commission and council members approved the purchase.
However, a part of the equipment called firmware was not certified by state election officials. The state allowed counties to use the equipment in May but are requiring state approval for November’s election.
Friday, August 20, 2004
SF Chronicle Editorial in support of voter verified paper trail legislation
"Every Vote Must Count," San Francisco Chronicle editorial, August 20, 2004
Today's S.F. Chronicle features an editorial urging the California legislature to pass SB 1438, which would require a voter verified paper record of each electronic ballot before the next statewide election, which is the March 2006 primary.
Text below:
--------
In a democracy, perhaps the only thing more frustrating than being denied the right to vote is voting without ever really knowing whether your ballot was actually counted.
That is why it is so hard to understand how an Assembly committee last week killed a bill that would have required paper printouts for electronic voting machines.
SB1438 would have required by January 2006 that the machines provide each voter with hard copies to verify their selections upon leaving the polling place. The bipartisan legislation, co-authored by Sens. Ross Johnson, R- Irvine, and Don Perata, D-Oakland, would have mandated the printouts six months sooner than the July 2006 deadline set by Secretary of State Kevin Shelley as a way for voters to confirm that their choices are accurately recorded.
The bill survived the Senate but died last week in the Assembly Appropriations Committee after opponents called it too costly -- up to $16 million to upgrade machines in the counties now using them without the printout capacity.
Disabled voters also opposed the bill, fearing counties might return to paper ballots that hinder their right to vote independently and in private.
The arguments have merit but are irrelevant if the machines are unreliable -- as with the one demonstrated in the Capitol a few days before the bill was killed. A highly touted touch-screen machine repeatedly discounted intended votes, a critical glitch that would have gone unsuspected without paper printouts.
"If these machines malfunction ... at the Capitol, why should we believe they are going to work at the polls?" Perata rightly wondered. The Assembly ought to revive SB1438. Voting is too precious to be entrusted to unreliable machines.
Today's S.F. Chronicle features an editorial urging the California legislature to pass SB 1438, which would require a voter verified paper record of each electronic ballot before the next statewide election, which is the March 2006 primary.
Text below:
--------
In a democracy, perhaps the only thing more frustrating than being denied the right to vote is voting without ever really knowing whether your ballot was actually counted.
That is why it is so hard to understand how an Assembly committee last week killed a bill that would have required paper printouts for electronic voting machines.
SB1438 would have required by January 2006 that the machines provide each voter with hard copies to verify their selections upon leaving the polling place. The bipartisan legislation, co-authored by Sens. Ross Johnson, R- Irvine, and Don Perata, D-Oakland, would have mandated the printouts six months sooner than the July 2006 deadline set by Secretary of State Kevin Shelley as a way for voters to confirm that their choices are accurately recorded.
The bill survived the Senate but died last week in the Assembly Appropriations Committee after opponents called it too costly -- up to $16 million to upgrade machines in the counties now using them without the printout capacity.
Disabled voters also opposed the bill, fearing counties might return to paper ballots that hinder their right to vote independently and in private.
The arguments have merit but are irrelevant if the machines are unreliable -- as with the one demonstrated in the Capitol a few days before the bill was killed. A highly touted touch-screen machine repeatedly discounted intended votes, a critical glitch that would have gone unsuspected without paper printouts.
"If these machines malfunction ... at the Capitol, why should we believe they are going to work at the polls?" Perata rightly wondered. The Assembly ought to revive SB1438. Voting is too precious to be entrusted to unreliable machines.
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